The Romanian president needs a solution: it will cost him but it will avoid bringing extremists into government

“I believe that President Nicușor Dan understood his position, his constitutional position, that of being a mediator very well. He was a political opponent of the PSD – in the local elections, in the presidential elections (and) we do not have a common political history. But this does not mean that I don’t observe that he understood and expressed very well his constitutional role of being a mediator,” Sorin Grindeanu said in April.

And in the period that followed, as it became clear the PSD president planned to dismiss Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan, his tone towards the head of state was almost tender.

On the day of the no-confidence motion, after it was successful, another leading PSD member, Daniel Zamfir, found himself speaking like a true “nicusorist” on Digi24: you’re balanced, Mr. President, what a a nice surprise, Mr. President.

Of course, there was a wider PSD chorus, but the eccentric popularity that Nicușor Dan has gained in the eyes of the PSD will cost him.

Nicușor Dan will have to pay on two levels:

  1. Electoral – because it has produced a shock among his voters and has generally produced a shock among those who, concerned about the rise of extremists, and  aware of the disastrous economic situation of the country and the dangerous situation in the world, had been critical at any attack on weak political stability.
  2. Political – because, once Bolojan fell, the president needs to deliver a reasonable solution even though there are no reasonable premises for such a thing.

President Nicușor Dan bears – I have previously written and will keep repeating it – some of the blame for the current political developments.

He’s to  blame for having facilitated the collapse of a government at a critical moment and at a time when the beleaguered economy risks being deprived of vital European funds.

The absorption of funds PNRR funds is now in great danger not only because the installation of a new government can cause big delays in reaching some milestones required by the PNRR, but especially because the PSD-AUR motion was, in substance, directed against the reforms assumed by Romania in the PNRR.

In his public appearances, President Nicușor Dan continues to call for calm and to give assurances that he deliver a presentable and pro-Western government.

The problem is that nothing that reality does not match the president’s rhetoric.

Nicușor Dan is promising three broad things: a pro-Western government, a government with a majority in Parliament and a government without AUR.

The first and last of the promises mean about the same thing. The second does not seem feasible – because if AUR holds the majority, the other two promises are broken; and a majority with USR and PNL, in a government with PSD, is not possible, as USR and PNL have announced they are going into opposition.

Under these circumstances, the only reasonable thing the president can do is to break one of his three promises in order to keep the other two.

This would mean that Nicușor Dan would propose a minority government led by the PSD, with Prime Minister Sorin Grindeanu; without AUR, PNL and USR. It should be noted here that both parties led by Ilie Bolojan and Dominic Fritz have announced that they will support, from the opposition, essential measures for the major international financing programs (PNRR, SAFE), as well as for the reforms associated with other strategic objectives, such as joining the OECD.

After stroking PSD on the head, it is time for Nicușor Dan to assume the effort and the political cost of his gesture, by forcing the PSD to pay part of the bill: the PSD’s entry as a minority government into Victoria Palace (Eds: the government offices).

In this way, Nicușor Dan would also ensure the swift installation of a fully functioning government and could redeem himself a bit because a minority PSD government could electorally weaken the PSD – being in government erodes support, and is extremely hard, politically, brutal even in a minority format.

It’s hard to identify another realistic solution (taking into account the decision of USR and PNL to remain in opposition) that is relatively digestible (because at least it does not include AUR in government) in the current context.

Of course, thanks to the games he played before the motion, Nicușor Dan comes out significantly weakened.

A minority PSD government will leave in people’s memory a Nicușor Dan who:

  1. It was not possible to keep at least one of his public promises (avoiding a minority government).
  2. He gave the country a PSD government.
  3. He weakened the general political equation by helping to  demolish a government with a large majority only to end up installing one without a majority.

But this should be everyone’s last concern – including Nicușor Dan!