Just a few days ago, The Economist argued that if the war went badly in Iran it would badly affect Israel. Here is the text, well worth reading HERE.
But for readers in a hurry, here are the first and last paragraphs:
- <<“If you take out Saddam—Saddam’s regime—I guarantee you that it will have enormous positive reverberations on the region,” Binyamin Netanyahu testified to Congress in 2002, as President George W. Bush was mulling an invasion of Iraq. After the war curdled from military triumph to strategic disaster, Mr Netanyahu’s advocacy for toppling Saddam Hussein helped darken suspicions, first in the academic world and then in American politics, that Israel had nefarious influence over American foreign policy. (…)
- Mr Netanyahu’s brutal prosecution of the war in Gaza further alienated Democrats while also exposing the risk of his bet on an “America First” Republican Party. Before the Iran war began, most Republicans under 45 already supported curtailing military aid to Israel, according to a poll in December by the Institute for Middle East Understanding. Mr Trump’s MAGA base will probably never turn against him. But that just means, if this war goes wrong, they will need someone else to blame. >>
Netanyahu’s decisive influence on Donald Trump in terms of the outbreak of the war in Iran has been extensively covered by the international media.
As far as I’m concerned, I noticed that since last year that a large number of foreign leaders struggle (without much success) to plead their causes with Trump, but only two do what they want with him. They are: Vladimir Putin and – Benjamin Netanyahu. Text – HERE
From the moment The Economist warned that Israel and its prime minister risk becoming convenient scapegoats in U.S. politics to the first resignation of a high-ranking U.S. intelligence official due to this, less than a week has passed.
On Tuesday, the head of the National Center for Counterterrorism, Joe Kent, announced his resignation, and made two serious accusations against the US president:
- That Trump lied to the American people: “Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation” – in his resignation.
- That Trump allowed himself to be influenced by a foreign power: “It is clear that we started this war because of pressure from Israel and its influential American lobby” – he wrote.
Kent had been appointed to the position last year, during Trump’s current term.
Although there is a temptation for Washington to downplay Joe Kent’s, it should be remembered that Joe Kent isn’t just anyone – neither in terms of his position (coordinator of the anti-terrorist fight) nor in terms of his experience: he is a veteran of the special forces and the CIA, and his wife was a cryptology technician for the US Navy and died a few years ago in a bombing, in Syria.
That is why it is expected that the echoes of the former counter-terrorism chief’s break with Trump, with an emphasis on Israel as a motive for his resignation, will not disappear, but will feed two monsters:
- On the one hand, the narrative related to Donald Trump’s judgement in engaging the US in the war against Iran.
- And on the other, the consequences of the Iranian reaction to the American-Israeli attacks: how will the Middle East transform once the US allies in the region have overnight become the almost defenseless victims of Tehran’s retaliation?
The first point will certainly develop on multiple dimensions. It should be borne in mind that 2026 is a tough election year in America, with elections for Congress and the economic implications of the war will be felt at the grassroots, as well as amplifying pre-existing economic difficulties.
The second point has a medium and long-time timeframe.
- First, let’s look at the nature of the war, which America has once again entered: it’s asymmetrical. This risks of undermining the effects of the US extraordinary military might. Washington has faced something like this before in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Each time the adventure ended in a traumatic political failure. The implications of the asymmetrical nature of such conflicts have invariably been the same: colossal financial costs, unbearable human costs, the inability of the US to reasonably control the dynamics of the conflict, and when and how they end. Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan were about that. The Iran sequel, although ongoing, seems to follow the same pattern (it is already worth noting that Trump’s “trip” to Iran has exceeded his initial idea of a blitzkrieg war).
- Secondly, let’s see why this conflict is asymmetrical: the imbalance of forces. Iran simply cannot wage war except as a terrorist, because of the primitive weapons it has compared to its attackers. But what is more serious is that Iran is an extremely large, densely populated country, with a difficult terrain. The Tehran regime is totally indifferent about the costs of the war on its population. In a confrontation with a Western enemy, this tactical advantage can become a strategic one. And, last but not least, Iran has two sources of inspiration: the war with Iraq (1980-1988) and the more recent US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (2001-2021). Between 1980 and 1988, the theocratic regime in Tehran resisted Saddam Hussein (although Baghdad had also been supported by Western powers) relying on martyrdom, scorching tactics and slaughtering its own troops without blinking. But those lessons were reinforced, three decades later, by what happened to the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2001-2021, Tehran had the opportunity to understand how not only a country like Iraq, but how the largest military force on the planet can be politically defeated by rudimentary adversaries. Finally, he undoubtedly understood that political victory is what counts, and political victory can compensate for any military defeat. In the first three weeks of the war, it has become clear that Iran is unscrupulously applying what it has learned from 1980 to 2020.
- Thirdly, let’s take note of the lack of clear objectives of the Trump administration and the president’s public communication style, which is likely to involuntarily rally elements of the regime with the Iranian population which is oppressed by the regime. Why? On the one hand, because often among Trump’s changing objectives, the initial idea of genuine regime change is missing. It’s a bad signal for the population. On the other hand, since Trump has sometimes signaled he does not care if Iran would break apart because of this war. In a deeply nationalistic but strongly ethnically divided country, the majority could see this as an existential threat to its integrity, while the minority could see it as a historic opportunity. Hence the danger of civil war and interethnic conflicts. Of course, the desperate signals that the US may be tempted to use the Kurds aren’t helpful. For the majority population of Iran it is a danger, for Turkey it is a danger, and the Kurds do not form a monolith, but are divided, because they are different from each other and have different histories and agendas.
- Fourthly, Iran, ravaged by serial bombings and beheadings by the regime, is getting closer to entering a stage of diffuse leadership, vertically with disposable supreme chiefs, and horizontally with a decentralized cell-based infrastructure (terrorism).
- Fifth, let’s look at the situation the Gulf monarchies plunged into overnight. After pumping a lot of money into developing a privileged partnership with the US, they found themselves attacked more often by Iran than Israel and in a serious trade crisis – from imports to exports. This trade crisis, starting with the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, threatens to quickly turn into a real economic crisis, and even a humanitarian one. If the Gulf leaders begin to believe that they have fooled themselves by investing in their relationship with America and especially the Trump family and his business friends ( possible, but also probable), then the story of the Middle East will soon be rewritten. Because the Gulf states today have every reason to consider switching their privileged relationship to other countries. They have two options: China and the European Union. And if the local populations, otherwise docile, have a moment of revelation, understanding that their leaders have simply been fooled by Trump in the last decade, the earthquake in the Gulf, caused by the US-Israeli war with Iran, risks developing internal frictions, perhaps similar to the Arab Spring 15 years ago.
- Sixth, let’s take note of Israel. By making the connection with the points above, related to the potential change of optics of the Gulf states towards America, we can identify a reduced willingness of these monarchies to warm up their relationship with Israel. One reason is envy – they may consider that Israel does not suffer the way they do; they may consider that Israel was the source of evil by convincing Trump to unleash chaos; and they may consider that Israel is selfishly solving its own agenda at their expense. Leaving the Gulf aside, but from a US perspective, it can be noted that Israel has become a subject of political partisanship, a theme that polarizes society and politics, while polls illustrate this trend. Things aren’t better in Europe given that anti-Semitism is dangerously on the rise, with polarization in European politics and echoes of former times, because of the war in Gaza and Israel’s extremist policy in the West Bank. The situation is deteriorating further with a war in Iran desired by Israel, but deeply unpopular in Europe, as well as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which has claimed numerous civilian casualties. Finally, Israel raises another serious problem from a US and European perspective: the evaporation of democratic values. Prime Minister Netanyahu is himself on trial for corruption and is perceived as a leader who uses his office and even wars to solve his legal problems and ensure his political survival. The moral and rule of law crisis in Israel is well known, which began before the massacres committed by Hamas on October 7, 2023. An Israel that is turning into an illiberal democracy, whose prime minister tries to change laws in his favor and in the fight against terrorists, levels Gaza and kills tens of thousands of civilians, that, in Iran, seems to abuse its special relationship with America, causing pain in the rest of the world shows an Israel that is losing its luster and increasingly alienating its friends. In the short term, Israel seems to be the big winner of Trump’s “trip” to Iran, but in the medium and long term, I am afraid that Israel may be one of the big losers.
And in this whole universe that is about to be reconfigured, Russia and China have a strong hand. They have all the conditions to capitalize on this in the US-Israeli war in Iran.
