Forty-five years of trying to defeat Hezbollah alone have produced failure. The time has come to turn Hezbollah from Israel’s problem into an international one.
Another half-dozen Israeli soldiers were killed in Lebanon in recent days, adding to a toll that continues to grow with no clear strategic endpoint in sight. Dozens of Lebanese were also reported killed, including a child — though it was not clear how many were Hezbollah militants.
One thing is for sure: this is not destroying Hezbollah. Israel’s government — an unstrategic assemblage if ever one there was — must rise above itself and conduct an honest assessment of what it is trying to accomplish in Lebanon, and whether the methods applied for nearly half a century have any realistic chance of success. Spoiler alert: they do not.
For about 45 years, Israel’s approach has rested on a simple premise: Hezbollah threatens Israel, Lebanon cannot control Hezbollah, and therefore Israel must deal with Hezbollah itself. The premise has survived governments of the left, center, and right. It has survived invasions and withdrawals and repeated wars. Yet after four and a half decades, the outcomes are difficult to dispute.
The terror group – despite its battering in 2024 – remains. Israel’s military is again stuck in a quagmire in southern Lebanon. Israeli soldiers continue to die there. Northern residents continue to live with uncertainty. And now Israelis confront the absurd fact that Iran is successfully compelling the United States into staying its hand — so great is Trump’s desperation for a deal that ends with Iran to end its global blackmail over the Strait of Hormuz.
If strategy is judged by results rather than intentions, this one has plainly failed. Here’s why, and here’s what to do.
The problem is not a lack of military capability. The problem is that the military objective and the political objective have never aligned. A buffer zone in southern Lebanon cannot eliminate Hezbollah. The terror organization’s infrastructure, leadership, financial networks, and political influence extend far beyond the border region. Rocket fire does not depend on control of a few villages near the frontier. Hezbollah now operates its rocket arsenal from the north of Lebanon, far from the reach of Israel’s ground forces, which are sitting ducks in the south.
So a military presence may prevent infiltrations but does not solve the strategic challenge. Anyone serious about destroying Hezbollah militarily must acknowledge what such an undertaking would actually require: A major campaign extending deep into Lebanon, all the way to the Bekaa Valley. The green areas below should the strongholds of Hezbollah before the current war.
Such an effort would, therefore, entail a prolonged occupation of large portions of the country, enormous financial costs, substantial Israeli casualties, and inevitably significant civilian suffering. Hezbollah would not obligingly stand and fight as a conventional army. It would disperse, blend into civilian areas, and wage a prolonged insurgency. International pressure would grow steadily. Images of destruction would dominate global coverage – as occurred with the fight against Hamas in Gaza. Eventually, outside powers would demand an end to the operation long before any ambitious vision of a Hezbollah-free Lebanon could be achieved. The world — and the US — simply will not tolerate another Gaza-scale cataclysm, and nor, of course, should Israel attempt it. It would actually be more absurd than continuing to tolerate Hezbollah, which is itself absurd.
Moreover, Israel’s current approach is squandering one of the most favorable political environments it has ever faced in Lebanon. For years, Hezbollah justified its position by portraying itself as Lebanon’s defender against Israel. Today, many Lebanese see matters very differently. After years of economic collapse, political dysfunction, regional adventures, and devastating conflict, Hezbollah is widely viewed as the principal obstacle to Lebanon’s recovery. The Lebanese government under President Joseph Aoun and PM Nawaf Salam is finally seeking a monopoly on force. Lebanese society wants a normal state – so that for the first time in decades, the positions of Israel and Lebanon substantially overlap.
That overlap should be treated as a strategic asset. Instead, Israel risks destroying it. Every military operation that causes extensive damage inside Lebanon shifts attention away from Hezbollah’s role in the country’s predicament and redirects it toward Israel. Every civilian casualty makes it easier for Hezbollah to wrap itself once again in the language of resistance and national defense. Every additional month of military activity narrows the distinction between Lebanon and Hezbollah precisely when Israel should be widening it.
.
This is why the growing enthusiasm in some Israeli circles for permanent buffer zones is so troubling. Following October 7, many Israelis concluded that territorial depth provides security. The instinct is understandable. The application of that lesson to Lebanon is misguided. Buffer zones, as we have seen, reinforce Hezbollah’s longstanding claim that Israel harbors territorial ambitions in Lebanon – and hands Iran a role as “protector” of the country.
They weaken Israel’s legitimacy while offering only limited security benefits against threats that can emerge from far beyond the occupied area. Most importantly, they transform Israel from a country seeking security into a country that appears to covet territory beyond its recognized border.
Israel’s strongest position has always been that it seeks no Lebanese land whatsoever. That position should not merely be maintained but elevated into the centerpiece of a new strategy. Israel should make clear that it is prepared to return fully to the international border and that its sole objective is security, not territory. Such a declaration would immediately alter the diplomatic conversation.
The focus would shift from Israel’s military presence to the far more important question of why an armed organization continues to operate outside the authority of the Lebanese state.
That is the conversation Israel should be encouraging because Hezbollah should not be treated primarily as Israel’s problem. It should be treated as Lebanon’s problem, the Arab world’s problem, and the international community’s problem.
For decades, Israel has effectively told the world that it will handle Hezbollah on its own. The predictable consequence is that the world views Hezbollah through the prism of Israeli military operations rather than through the prism of Lebanese sovereignty. Israel assumes responsibility for solving the problem and then finds itself condemned for the methods available to it.
A smarter strategy would reverse that equation.
Israel should actively seek a broad international consensus that the existence of an armed militia outside state control is incompatible with a stable Lebanon. It should work closely with the Lebanese government rather than dismissing Lebanon because it is weak and incongruously threatening the country to take sterner action at the same time. It should encourage greater involvement by the US, European countries, moderate Arab governments, and the Arab League.
It should support international efforts to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces, improve border security, reduce Hezbollah’s patronage networks, and help Lebanese institutions establish effective authority throughout the country. It should be open to the idea of a multinational force arriving to help the Lebanese.
A few days ago President Donald Trump mused about a Syrian role; this is problematic, but whether Syria can help can be explored.
That is the conversation Israel should be encouraging because Hezbollah should not be treated primarily as Israel’s problem. It should be treated as Lebanon’s problem, the Arab world’s problem, and the international community’s problem.
For decades, Israel has effectively told the world that it will handle Hezbollah on its own. The predictable consequence is that the world views Hezbollah through the prism of Israeli military operations rather than through the prism of Lebanese sovereignty. Israel assumes responsibility for solving the problem and then finds itself condemned for the methods available to it.
A smarter strategy would reverse that equation.
Israel should actively seek a broad international consensus that the existence of an armed militia outside state control is incompatible with a stable Lebanon. It should work closely with the Lebanese government rather than dismissing Lebanon because it is weak and incongruously threatening the country to take sterner action at the same time. It should encourage greater involvement by the US, European countries, moderate Arab governments, and the Arab League.
It should support international efforts to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces, improve border security, reduce Hezbollah’s patronage networks, and help Lebanese institutions establish effective authority throughout the country. It should be open to the idea of a multinational force arriving to help the Lebanese.
A few days ago President Donald Trump mused about a Syrian role; this is problematic, but whether Syria can help can be explored.
Indeed, Syria is critical in encircling Hezbollah, one of the advantages of the current situation. The new Syrian regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa, who hates Hezbollah for having propped up Bashar Assad during over a decade of civil war, has ended the use of Syria by Iran as a superhighway for weapons to Hezbollah.
None of this requires naivete about Lebanon’s limitations, and any strategy proposed will immediately draw a chorus of skeptical critics. But here, as elsewhere, maturity requires seeking the least-bad option, not a good one.
Is the least-bad option Israeli soldiers and Lebanese civilians being killed in aid of a strategy that does not even eliminate Hezbollah? Is it more of the same – which has yielded a litany of failure? I do not think so. Israeli pundits are great at explaining what won’t work, or why they’re skeptical; they’re less great at offering better plans. No one wants to seem like a sucker. This is not the road to wisdom.
Yes, it’s infuriating for Israelis to see that Trump’s pitiful surrender — for fear of continuing economic pain from the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz — includes allowing Iran a say on Lebanon while issuing diktats to Israel. Nonetheless, if Israel abides by the ceasefire the US seeks, so too, probably, will Hezbollah. That’s because this is also what Iran wants, in order to nail down the astounding capitulation deal from Trump. But a ceasefire at least creates space for diplomacy, coalition-building, and experimentation. Israel should use that space.
It might also consider a controlled withdrawal back to the international border, or close to it, coupled with a massive deployment along the border, contingent on concrete steps by the Lebanese government and accompanied by international assistance. A possible compromise is a pullback to a buffer zone of a few hundred meters, taking highlands that overlook Israeli communities right on the border. That would minimize the friction while protecting against infiltrations.
If Hezbollah refuses to comply with a Lebanese government order to disarm, Beirut should seek international assistance to enforce its sovereignty. The Lebanese Armed Forces would remain in the lead, but the government could formally invite foreign partners to provide military support through a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Such an arrangement would allow countries including the United States, France, and selected Arab states to assist the Lebanese military in dismantling Hezbollah’s remaining armed infrastructure and restoring the state’s monopoly on force.
Arab participation would be essential. Involvement by the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council would make clear that disarming Hezbollah is not a Western or Israeli project, but a regional effort to support Lebanese sovereignty. Gulf states could reinforce this message by committing substantial reconstruction aid and investment, offering Lebanon a clear economic dividend for finally ending decades of Hezbollah domination, Iranian interference, and instability.
There is ample precedent for this approach. The US–Iraq SOFA provided a framework for foreign forces operating at the invitation of a sovereign government with clearly defined authorities and withdrawal mechanisms. NATO’s mission in Afghanistan demonstrated how foreign troops can support local security forces while helping them carry out difficult military objectives. More flexible arrangements, such as the US–Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement, show how external military support can be provided without permanent basing. The principle is straightforward: when a sovereign state cannot fully enforce its authority, it may lawfully invite partners to help it do so.
Israel needs to keep its powder dry, or drier. Military force does have its place, and will always be there; it is brainpower that seems, of late, in short supply.
