Romania’s newly elected president, Nicușor Dan announced the following a year ago:
- “The main priority …. is the correction of the budget deficit, and the dialogue with the political parties will focus exclusively on identifying solutions in this regard.”
This idea, of the absolute priority that the new president gave to reducing the budget deficit, has featured in numerous other occasions since he began his mandate in May 2025.
His message was crystal clear: first the problem of the deficit, followed be other emergencies and arrears inherited from his predecessor, such as the justice system, the appointment of the heads of secret services and so on.
The fact that Nicușor Dan made balancing the budget his number one priority and negotiations for the formation of the new government focused on this was justified, realistic, inspired.
The figures left by the Ciolacu Government spoke for themselves, as did the markets.
A year later, reality has only reconfirmed the fact that the president was correct to appoint Ilie Bolojanprime minister and form a governing coalition that would support the head of state’s top priority.
Ilie Bolojan proved to be a prime minister dedicated to fightin the budgetary imbalances, and the parties in the coalition, with all their sins, nevertheless supported some necessary measures.
The figures speak for themselves: from a budget deficit of 9.3% of GDP in 2024, the deficit fell to 7.9% in 2025; and from a deficit of 2.92% in the first four months of 2025, it fell to 1.17% in the first four months of 2026 (this was “a major correction“, the Finance Minister said, with a cut of 32 billion lei in spending).
In parallel with the spending cuts, Bolojan increased tax revenues and increased the share of investments from European funds and PNRR.
This trend needs to be maintained, because, despite the successes of the last 12 months, cutting the budget deficit is a long-term issue – the target being to lower it below 3% of GDP which means years of concerted efforts.
But despite being commendable and reconfirming that that the head of state was right to put an absolute emphasis on it, what is less comprehensible is Nicușor Dan’s political behavior from the autumn of 2025 to the spring of 2026: a suspiciously weak appetite to strongly support Ilie Bolojan, a suspiciously weak appetite to discourage the PSD’s temptation to slow down reforms and to also bring down the Bolojan government.
So what was the president’s logic when he nonchanlantly allowed anti-reformist forces to gather and prepare the ground and then, on May 5, to oust a government that was on the right path for reducing the deficit?
What was Nicușor Dan’s logic in refusing to hold on to a government and a coalition that put into practice an objective that Nicușor Dan had considered strategic and vital?
The current political crisis has a profoundly destructive effect on what has been achieved in these 12 months and has is destructive on what needs to be continued starting from the foundations the government laid.
When at the start of his term, Nicușor Dan explained that there was nothing more urgent than the fight against the deficit, also asked the public for understanding that things won’t happen at once. He said the deficit was paramount followed by the justice system, and the appointments at the head of the intelligence services will also come only later.
Of course, there are other big issues that will have to wait their turn until the “deficit operation” is in operation.
As justice, the secret services and so on are hardly trivial, the way Nicușor Dan set out his priorities was risky.
The people who voted for him (and not only them) had huge expectations in these areas, and in many ways, reforms to the justice system and intelligence services are connected to the budget deficit. Because the more corruption and gray areas flourish, there is a greater risk of draining the public purse and slowing down essential reforms, which implicitly widens the budget deficit.
When Nicușor Dan asked for public understanding that the deficit will come first, then the rest, some people understood and accepted, and others didn’t.
But after a year in office, those who understood and accepted are jusified in feeling fooled: the deficit has fallen sharply, but the rest is a disaster (Nicușor Dan agreed to appoint all the controversial names as top prosecutors, Lia Savonea became the head of the High Court, and he has yet to appoint civilian chiefs to head the intelligence services).
Even if the story of the deficit struggles like a fish on land, also thanks to President Dan’s attitude, the Bolojan governmenthas been ousted by a motion that was deeply opposed to reforms needed to reduce the deficit, the political crisis got out of control, and chances of a new coherent, efficient and decent government are slim.
Nicușor Dan seems to be one of the most bizarre cases of self-sabotage: in just one year, he made the deficit a priority, he put together a team the Bolojan cabinet and a coalition that proved to be reasonably effective in tackling the deficit. But then, just as quickly, he failed to provide full support to the goovernment and to intervene quickly and decisively when the coalition began to wobble.
He sacrificed a lot on the altar of deficit, he succeeded a lot, but then he jeopordized everything.
In doing so, Nicușor Dan raised legitimate questions about his logic, but also endangered the efforts he had voluntarily engaged in and unequivocally assumed.
And this comes with a political price that is expensive for him, and exorbitant for the country
