The US president is under pressure from all sides to offer a quick exit from the Iranian swamp, pressed from all sides internally and externally.
Except a quick exit is not possible. Likewise, an exit that makes the world a safer place, and makes Iran a lesser threat than before February 28, 2026, is also impossible.
Since the weekend, the Trump administration has been trumpeting hope and optimism, giving the impression that an agreement is taking shape (or, more precisely, the start of serious negotiations leading to an agreement).
In order for this, it is obvious that Trump needed to be short on relevant details combined with convoluted statements/posts, sometimes in an exaggeratedly optimistic tone, sometimes in a suspiciously temperate tone.
There was an impact after his rhetorical performance: the price of a barrel fell a little below $100. That’s it!
It’s not the first time, since the outbreak of the war, that Donald Trump comes with optimistic stories saying a happy ending is on the horizon, just to calm the markets for a while.
But today such tactics are increasingly irrelevant.
Because after three months of conflict and against the backdrop of an un precedented global energy crisis, the world simply needs America to do something completely different: a definitive end to the war, where Iran is prevented from posing a threat, and the reopening the Strait of Hormuz as it was until February 28 – free movement, safe and free of charge.
But unfortunately, Donald Trump can’t deliver, no matter how much and how well he negotiates.
This is because:
- If Trump simply stops the confrontation and withdraws his troops from the region, Iran still remains a threat. Even US intelligence assessments indicate that Tehran’s conventional military arsenal remains substantial, despite intense US-Israeli bombing.
- If Trump obtains promises from Iran that it will not pursue nuclear weapons, thses promises are worth about as much as the paper they are written on, as long as the enriched uranium remains in Iran, and Iranian know-how cannot be “obliterated”, and Iran gains access to many billions in financing – from the unfreezing of its assets taxing traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. In fact, Tehran has no reason to give up either of its two levers – nuclear and control over the strait. On the contrary, the last three months gives it fundamental reasons to strategically rely on these two levers. And the disadvantageous position in which Donald Trump finds himself today – both at home and internationally – massively enhances Tehran’s position in the negotiations.
- Should the US-Iranian negotiations lead to the immediate unblocking of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, things would still look bad. It would not definitively cancel the Iranian threat (What would prevent Iran, in the future, from resuming its blackmail?). Also, the resumption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would be a false victory for Trump because until February 28, traffic had been free, so the problem simply did not exist. At the same time, even a false victory like this would be in exchange for something substantial, therefore a costly concession made by America to Iran. In other words: after the war, Trump would pay Iran in one form or another for a service that would have remained free if Trump had not started the war.
Given the problem that the Americans are now discussing with the Iranians, directly and through intermediaries, the negotiations are looking good to very good for the Tehran regime, while for the rest of the world, the outcome is not looking so good.
The details of a possible agreement don’t even matter, since we can guess what might happen:
- Iran will gain access to money it had only dreamed of.
- Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will always be under the sword of Damocles.
- Iran’s nuclear program will not be brought to zero risk.
- Iran’s conventional military strength will be rebuilt (according to US intelligence, Tehran managed to replenish some of these resources during the truce, so under extremely harsh conditions; therefore it’s logical that it will be much easier for it if some sanctions are lifted, it has access to new sources of funding and if the truce is replaced by a more predictable and more sustainable form: the cessation of hostilities.
- The Gulf states will be forced to seek some form of accommodation with Tehran.
- Israel will see almost all its strategic objectives have not been achieved, while its essential relationship with the US (not only with the US) profoundly altered.
- And for Iranians which are largely opposed to the oppressive regime, the post-war situation will actually worsen. It should be noted that this regime did not hesitate to kill tens of thousands in under 48 hours even when Trump threatened the regime with decapitation. It is easy to guess that the regime will be even more motivated and capable of repression after an eventual “capitulation” of the Trump administration in the form of a comprehensive agreement.
Of course, there is one more thing to be said: regardless of its form and content, an eventual peace agreement between the Trump administration and Iran risks always having more enemies than friends: first in the US, Israel and Iran, but also other areas – from Europe to the Middle East.
As such, the durability and functionality of such a deal will be questioned from the start.
For Iran, the balance will most likely look like this: money, power, rearmament.
