Russia stepped up its disinformation campaigns in Romania after 2016, using subtle tactics to undermine people’s trust in the government and weaken support for NATO and the EU. These campaigns, often carried out from the Republic of Moldova, to avoid anti-Russian reactions, target sensitive issues such as cultural and economic identity.
 A recent example is the false claim that Ukrainian refugee children receive higher state allowances than Romanian children, a message that Calin Georgescu amplified in his election campaign. This is how Russia seeks to create internal divisions and destabilize the cohesion of the region, in the strategic context of Romania within NATO and its energy ambitions, according to a report by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
- “Russia’s strategic objective of undermining the West is closely linked to its goal of fragmenting the European Union (EU) and NATO, two pillars of Western cohesion and security. To achieve this goal, Russia uses hybrid warfare, tailored to exploit the specific vulnerabilities of each member state. In countries highly dependent on Russian energy, Moscow uses economic blackmail, using gas and oil supplies as tools of coercion to influence political decisions and cause divisions within the EU. In contrast, in states with less dependence on Russian energy (e.g. Romania), the Kremlin focuses on disinformation and propaganda campaigns.
- These campaigns typically use messages that resonate deeply with the public, even when they have nothing to do with Ukraine or Russia’s actions. Instead, the messages amplify discontent with domestic governments, weaken trust in institutions, and undermine support for joint NATO and EU policies. By amplifying sensitive topics such as economic hardship, social inequalities or controversial political decisions, Russia aims to erode public support for pro-Ukraine positions and disrupt the unity needed for coordinated action by the West. This multifaceted approach underscores Russia’s adaptability and determination to exploit divisions and vulnerabilities to achieve its broader geopolitical goals.
- Romania plays a critical role on NATO’s Eastern Flank, being a strategic buffer against potential threats from Russia and an important ally in securing the Black Sea region. As a frontline state, Romania hosts important NATO military infrastructure, including missile defense systems, and contributes significantly to regional security through its robust support for NATO initiatives and Ukraine’s defense efforts. This geostrategic importance makes Romania a natural target for Russia’s hybrid campaigns. By undermining public trust in the government and eroding support for NATO and EU policies, Russia aims to weaken the cohesion of the Eastern Flank and disrupt the alliance’s ability to respond effectively to security challenges.
- In addition, Romania’s commitment to diversify its energy sources and reduce dependence on Russian supplies further threatens Russia’s levers of influence in the region. An essential element of this strategy is the Neptun Deep project, the largest natural gas initiative in the Romanian Black Sea sector. Developed in collaboration by OMV Petrom and Romgaz, Neptun Deep is set to start production in 2027, with an estimated annual production of approximately eight billion cubic meters of natural gas, positioning Romania as a major energy producer and potential exporter within the EU. This development improves Romania’s energy security and diminishes Russia’s influence on regional energy markets, challenging its traditional role as the main supplier. As a result, Russia perceives Romania’s energy ambitions as a direct threat to its strategic interests, stepping up its efforts to destabilize the country through hybrid warfare tactics.
- These factors explain why Russia has consistently maintained its operations of influencing the Romanian public over the past two decades, using themes that resonate deeply with the local population. One of the most prominent narratives has been related to keeping Romania’s natural resources in Romanian hands, a message used strategically to undermine U.S. investment in the country’s oil and gas sector, including projects such as Neptun Deep. By supporting the framework in which foreign investment is seen as a threat to national sovereignty, Russia has sought to encourage public resistance to Western economic involvement. Moscow has also supported campaigns that appeal to Romania’s Christian nationalist sentiment — a characteristic that many Romanians consider defining within the EU. This narrative often links Romania to its Christian Orthodox heritage, although the Romanian Orthodox Church is officially aligned with Constantinople and often at odds with the Russian Church. By appealing to these cultural and religious currents, Russia aims to amplify divisions between Romania and its Western allies, erode trust in foreign partnerships, and strengthen its influence in the region.
- Russia began visibly supporting disinformation campaigns in the early 2000s and significantly escalated its propaganda efforts in Romania after 2016. Since then, articles and posts have begun to appear on social networks promoting Russia’s official positions in Romanian. Most of these messages, although published in Romanian, came from the Republic of Moldova (where both Romanian and Russian are spoken), rather than from Romania itself. This reflects Moscow’s caution in directly promoting its narratives in Romania, given the country’s deeply anti-Russian sentiment. Instead, disinformation has focused on socioeconomic and cultural identity issues that resonate with Romanians, using subtle tactics to shape public opinion without provoking direct rejection.
- A clear example of the subtlety in Russian disinformation campaigns has been the effort to undermine support for Ukraine in recent years. One of the key messages promoted by Russian-backed platforms focuses on the false claim that Ukrainian refugee children receive higher financial allowances from the state than Romanian children. This narrative is constructed to fuel resentment and sow division, portraying the government as favoring foreign nationals over its own citizens. However, these campaigns intentionally omit the fact that financial support for Ukrainian refugee children is funded by the EU, not the Romanian government. Romania, as a net beneficiary of EU funds, receives significantly more financial support from the EU than it contributes. (This narrative was further amplified during the presidential campaign of populist candidate Calin Georgescu, who used it to tap into economic frustrations and nationalist sentiments. Georgescu also incorporated Christian nationalist symbols into his rhetoric, appealing to voters disillusioned with mainstream politics and those who wish to assert Romania’s cultural and religious identity in the face of perceived external threats.)”











