Erdogan arrests his rival, showing once again: The fall of the courts Is the fall of freedom
When Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu—widely seen as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s most formidable political rival—was arrested last week at his home on flimsy corruption charges, Turkey entered a new and dangerous phase in its long democratic unraveling. His detention, followed by mass protests, violent crackdowns, and the arrest of demonstrators and journalists, is the natural outcome of years of democratic backsliding — which began with the dismantling of judicial independence.
Turkey’s descent is not just Turkey’s problem, and it’s not just inconvenient because Turkey is large and important, but rather it is a warning. It is a warning to anyone who is indifferent about the outrageous politicizing of the American justice system — and the efforts by the Trump administration to neuter the checks on power and circumvent the constitution, which are the only two things that make the political judiciary even remotely acceptable.
The architecture of liberal democracy — the system of checks and balances, of independent courts, of protected rights — does not dismantle itself overnight. It is chipped away in full view of the public, under the pretense of “majority rule” and national interest. The public is fed bullshit about how the elitist “deep state” is trying to impede the representatives of the people from doing whatever the hell they want. It is done gradually, even legally, until suddenly a country that holds elections no longer holds power to account.
Indeed, in Israel, alongside the tragedy there is comedy, as Netanyahu, a criminal defendant at present, has adopted the “deep state” nonsense in an effort to curry favor with his patron Trump. His lickspittle tweet was heavily promoted by Elon Musk, the co-president who is not a natural-born citizen.
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Once such processes are successful, as it has been in Erdogan’s Turkey, leaders feel free to arrest their leading political rivals on trumped up charges. The next step from this stage – which we might call fake democracy – is full dictatorship. When that final leap is made, as occurred in Russia, Vladimir Putin’s rival Alexei Navalny turns up dead in a gulag.
To understand how this happens, and why it’s so dangerous, we must begin with a clarification. The term liberal democracy is often misunderstood, particularly in America. “Liberal,” in this context, has nothing to do with left-wing politics or partisan ideology. It comes from the classical tradition of liberty: a system in which power is restrained through law, minority rights are protected, and the elected government is not all-powerful. Liberal democracy means that even the democratically elected cannot do whatever they please.
Courts are therefore empowered to strike down laws. Bureaucrats are protected from political purges. Journalists are free to investigate the state. These are not anti-democratic institutions; they are the very essence of democracy when defined not merely as majority rule, but as constrained majority rule, in which each citizen, not just the majority, has rights that cannot be voted away. Obviously, there is a legitimate and complicated question about how to appoint the gatekeepers.
On the one hand it cannot be political – and on the other, if it is just professional elites deciding, this gives rise to criticism. Each country has different systems, and America’s is actually quite political, with politicians confirming judges and some positions in the judiciary being directly elected; what makes it tolerable is the very robust constitution. I have concluded, in any case, that this is a zone of life where so-called elitism is essential.
Either way, at this point the very principle of constraints on power is under assault. In recent years, a growing number of political leaders have recast it as illegitimate, arguing that anything they choose to do is “the will of the people.” Why should courts protect the rights of minorities the majority dislikes? Why should the media be allowed to scrutinize leaders who were elected with a mandate?
This populist logic is seductive — and toxic. It insists that elections are the only source of legitimacy, and that anything that stands in the way of the majority’s chosen leader is elitist, partisan, or worse. But history teaches that such thinking is the beginning of the end.
Take Turkey. Erdogan’s rise began within a democratic framework. He was elected and did some good things – needed economic reforms, combating corruption. He governed with popular support. But over time, he came to see institutions not as partners in democracy but as impediments to his rule, and turned ever more authoritarian. After a failed military coup in 2016 he used the moment to purge the judiciary, fire thousands of judges, and replace them with loyalists. Thousands of academics, civil servants, and journalists were also jailed or exiled.
A 2017 referendum, narrowly passed in a subtly engineered environment with the government directly or indirectly controlling major media, gave Erdogan vast new powers, abolishing the office of prime minister and consolidating executive control. Courts ceased to be a check on his authority. Opposition figures faced politically motivated trials. Critical media was shut down or brought under state control.
Despite being a NATO member, Erdogan began pursuing an increasingly rogue foreign policy. He has occupied part of Syria; he has backed Azerbaijan in its 2023 starvation-blockade and then attack on Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to the ethnic cleansing of its 120,000 Armenians; last year he suggested he’d invade Israel and this week he has publicly called for its destruction.
All of it shows a democracy going off the rails. And now, with Imamoglu’s arrest, we see the full flowering of this process. The absurd charge sheet — running a criminal organization, accepting bribes, rigging bids — is plainly political — and effective. The leading challenger to the presidency is now behind bars. His supporters are being beaten in the streets. The judiciary, having long since surrendered its independence, offers no protection.
The costs to Turkey of all this have been immense. The economy has cratered. The lira has lost over 80% of its value since 2018. Inflation is rampant, exceeding 60% in recent months. Foreign investment has dried up. Tourism has faltered. The dream of EU membership—once a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy—has collapsed entirely. Brussels cannot admit a country that jails mayors and crushes free expression.
But Erdogan remains in power. And the machinery of elections continues to grind on—giving a veneer of legitimacy to a government that no longer respects the fundamentals of democratic rule. This is what happens when liberal principles are abandoned: elections do not disappear, but they cease to matter.
This should give pause to anyone who believes that voting alone is the bedrock of freedom. The Greeks knew better. Plato warned that unrestrained democracy could quickly collapse into tyranny, that the passions of the crowd, inflamed by clever demagogues, could sweep away institutions designed to moderate and channel them. Aristotle argued that the best states combined democratic and aristocratic elements—balancing popular power with the wisdom and stability of the few.
In the modern era, that “aristocratic” element is the judiciary. Judges must be trained, impartial, and independent. That means, by necessity, they are not chosen by popular vote. Nor should they be chosen by partisan leaders seeking ideological enforcers. Judicial independence requires a certain distance—from both the crowd and the politician. In that sense, yes: judges must be elite. Not in wealth or pedigree, but in responsibility. Their legitimacy comes not from popularity but from principle.
This is an uncomfortable truth in populist times. Many bristle at the idea of “unelected judges” making decisions that affect millions. But the alternative is worse. If judges become politicians in robes, swayed by public opinion or party loyalty, then the last line of defense against tyranny disappears.
Even in the United States — whose Constitution is stronger than most — the pressures are mounting. The Supreme Court is now perceived by many as a partisan institution, and confirmation battles have become proxy wars.
So this is how it starts. Not with a coup, but with a question: Why should the courts be apolitical. Turkey shows us the answer. Once the courts fall, nothing stands between the ruler and the ruled. Laws become tools of power. Elections become theater. Rights become conditional. And the people — those once so eager to see their will prevail — find that their will no longer matters. Be careful what you wish for.
