Moldova’s relevance is easy to miss. Landlocked, impoverished, and often dismissed as peripheral, it rarely features in Western headlines. Yet its location makes it indispensable to Europe’s security map.
To its east lies Ukraine, still fighting Russia’s invasion. To its west stands Romania, a NATO member that has become a frontline state in sustaining Kyiv’s defense. Inside Moldova itself, Russian “peacekeepers” have occupied the separatist enclave of Transnistria for decades. If a pro-Russian government emerged in Chișinău, Moscow could reinforce those troops, pushing new forces directly onto NATO’s frontier and completing the encirclement of Ukraine from nearly every side — Belarus to the north, Donbas to the east, Crimea to the south, and Moldova to the west.
Just across the Prut River, in Romania, sits Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, NATO’s largest installation in southeastern Europe and a vital artery for resupplying Ukraine. A Moldova aligned with Russia would put hostile forces within view of that facility. For the alliance, the implications would be profound.
Moscow’s Playbook in Moldova
Recognizing this, the Kremlin has treated Moldova as a testing ground for its hybrid warfare. A Bloomberg investigation earlier this year revealed leaked documents showing Moscow’s strategy: block PAS from securing a majority, topple Sandu if possible, and replace her reformist government with a pliant pro-Russian coalition.
The methods were wide-ranging. Russia funneled roughly €200 million into Moldovan politics in 2024 — an extraordinary figure equal to nearly one percent of GDP. The money bankrolled protests, bought votes, subsidized parties, and financed a disinformation apparatus that blanketed social media platforms from TikTok to Telegram. Paid influencers, bot networks, and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels churned out endless narratives warning of “gay Europe,” denouncing corruption, and promising cheap gas under Russian patronage.
The Orthodox Church, subordinate to Moscow, was enlisted as well. Reuters revealed that priests were flown to Russia, feted with gifts, and instructed to return home preaching against EU membership and in favor of “traditional values.” The goal was to weaponize faith and identity against integration with the West.
Cyberattacks targeted government institutions. Call centers spread rumors of electoral fraud. And GRU operatives trained dozens of agitators in Serbia, preparing them to provoke violence on the streets of Chișinău in the event of a disputed vote.
Moldovan authorities took the threat seriously. Days before the ballot, Prime Minister Dorin Recean warned of a Russian “occupation plan.” Security services detained more than 70 individuals linked to the schemes. Several Kremlin-aligned parties — including Irina Vlah’s Inima Moldovei and Victoria Furtună’s Moldova Mare — were barred from the race after evidence of illegal financing surfaced. Their removal likely prevented Russia from diverting as much as ten percent of the electorate, a tactic it had successfully used in 2023 to propel an obscure candidate, Evgenia Gutsul, into the governorship of Gagauzia.
The Weaponization of Energy
Moscow also tightened the screws through energy blackmail. In January 2025, Gazprom abruptly cut gas deliveries to Moldova proper, citing a fictitious debt, while maintaining full supplies to Transnistria. The result was immediate and brutal: inflation surged toward 30 percent, hitting food and medicine hardest in Europe’s poorest state. The message was clear — loyalty to Russia will be rewarded, defiance punished.
Romania has since stepped in to cover Moldova’s energy needs, but subsidies from Brussels remain modest. The EU did provide €20 million in emergency aid during the winter and later announced a €1.9 billion Reform and Growth package, but those sums pale compared to the cost of losing Moldova strategically. Moscow’s use of energy as a weapon has already shaken Europe once; allowing it to succeed in Moldova would embolden the Kremlin to repeat the tactic elsewhere.
A Long Shadow of History
The territory once known as Bessarabia has for centuries been contested ground. Ottoman rule was followed by Russian annexation in the nineteenth century. In 1940, Stalin claimed the land under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, incorporating it into the Soviet Union as the Moldavian SSR. Deportations, executions, and russification campaigns sought to sever the province from its Romanian roots. Moldovans were told they were a distinct nationality, taught a Cyrillic script, and forced into a manufactured identity.
Independence in 1991 did not erase these divisions. The legacy of Soviet engineering left Moldova fractured — Romanian in language and culture, but with deep Russian influence embedded in its politics, church, and media. That fracture remains Moscow’s main lever of control.
The Voters’ Verdict
Against this backdrop, the election result is all the more striking. In October 2024, Moldovans had endorsed EU membership in a referendum by only the narrowest of margins — just over 50 percent. Many feared the parliamentary election would show backsliding or deadlock. Instead, PAS not only held its ground but expanded its mandate.
The outcome is a rare case of good news for the democratic West. Moldovans have chosen to deepen their European path despite the intimidation, bribery, and propaganda unleashed by Moscow. For Brussels, the result is a badly needed success at a time when enlargement fatigue is palpable. Ukraine’s path to membership is blocked by war. Georgia, once a frontrunner, has turned away from reforms. That leaves Moldova as the most viable candidate in the EU’s immediate neighborhood.
PAS had already set 2028 as the target year for accession. Now, with a parliamentary majority, that ambition becomes a national project. Whether Brussels moves swiftly enough to capitalize on it will be the next test.
The Stakes for the West
The question now is whether the democratic West has the will to defend fragile states from Russian subversion. The Kremlin’s playbook is well known: disinformation, energy coercion, covert funding, religious manipulation. Moldova has been its latest laboratory. If the experiment succeeds here, the formula will be applied again — in the Balkans, in the Baltics, and deeper inside the EU itself.
Moldova’s voters have chosen Europe, not Russia. The question now is whether Brussels, Washington, and the broader alliance will match that courage with the resources and political will required. Losing Moldova would cost far more than stabilizing it.
Mihail Nesteriuc is a journalist based in Chisinau.
